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Many feminist authors have noted that the typical nationalist suggestion that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-Davis , Moller-Okin , and , and the discussion in the volume on Okin, Satz et al. Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture.
Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity. For example, telling writers, musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage interferes with the freedom of creation. The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so. Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic background live together and very often value this kind of life.
The very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory especially the classical nationalist one and experience. But the problems get worse. In practice, it does not seem accidental that the invidious particularistic form of nationalism, claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, is so widespread.
The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: as Ernst Gellner famously pointed out, there is too little territory for all candidate ethnic groups to have a state, and the same goes for other goods demanded by nationalists for the exclusive use of their co-nationals. According to some authors McCabe , the invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: if one values one's own ethnic group highly the simplest way is to value it tout court.
If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others. The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye.
This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable, difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis, and politically less efficient. Philosophers sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these.
In order to help the reader find his or her way through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case. Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.
It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises figuring in each of the lines of thought summarized below: namely, that the assumptions often live an independent life in the philosophical literature. Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular.
For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate.
These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism purporting to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies.
The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device connecting its members to some important values. Here is a characterization. The deep communitarian perspective is a theoretical perspective on political issues in the case under consideration, on nationalism that justifies a given political arrangement here, a nation-state by appeal to deep philosophical assumptions about human nature, language, community ties and identity in a deeper, philosophical sense.
The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good e. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task. Unfortunately, this crucial claim is rarely defended in detail in the literature.
But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above: The idea is that people make use of different styles to express their humanity.
The styles are generally determined by the communities to which they belong. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other. Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers.
The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a nation's members.
A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort: Cosmopolitanism is the view that one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings regardless of geographical or cultural distance , and political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states.
Critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes argue that these two claims are incoherent, since human beings generally strive best under some global institutional arrangement like ours that concentrates power and authority at the level of states. Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism.
In his writings B. Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism ibid, The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin , and Taylor , and its various versions worked out in considerable detail by authors such as Yael Tamir , David Miller , , , Kai Nielsen , Michel Seymour and Chaim Gans See also the debate around Miller's work in De Schutter and Tinnevelt In the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light, for instance in Miller a , Sung Ho Kim or Brian Vick Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.
It is important to mention here a more utopian proposal due to Chandran Kukathas , which nicely combines multicultural pluralism with the distinctiveness of particular communities that classical nationalism celebrates.
Some of these individual islands might be quite unpleasant by liberal standards; what makes the archipelago liberal overall is that each community guarantees its dissenting members the right to exit which might have a high price, if former members have nowhere to go with any prospect for a decent life.
The first level of political organization might thus be non-liberal Kukathas hopes it will not turn out to be so , while the second level would be strongly liberal. The proposal nicely combines the traditional features of classical nationalism with very liberal, almost anarchic traits of the whole. Unfortunately, it is hard to see what would keep such an archipelago together without a strong unifying state, which Kukathas would not have.
A clear danger is a slide towards a multipolar achipelago, with some big and powerful islands say, a huge Islamic island, a huge EU-type island, and so on. Let me return to the main line of exposition. Here are the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal and cosmopolitan nationalists propose.
First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength, and cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their domicile within the state.
Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make.
The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like.
Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted.
The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don't share the same culture. The community thereby becomes a network of morally connected agents, i.
A prominent obligation of each individual concerns the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all language and customs: they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved and reinforced. The general assumption that moral obligations increase with cultural proximity is often criticized as problematic. Moreover, even if we grant this general assumption in theory, it breaks down in practice.
Nationalist activism is most often turned against close and substantially similar neighbors rather than against distant strangers, so that in many important contexts the appeal to proximity will not work.
It might, however, retain its potential force against culturally distant groups. The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish.
In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and the individual's own life in particular. There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups. Taylor , concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. Critics of nationalism point out that flourishing might have too high a price, especially in the form of aggressiveness towards neighbors.
Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as people — we come to be who we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature.
This claim certainly has some plausibility. For example, Nielsen writes: We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some part of an objective social reality: a nation, though not necessarily a state, with its distinctive traditions.
What we find in people — and as deeply embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be able to say what they can do but to say who they are.
This is found, not created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality or race or religion or some slice or amalgam thereof…. Under modern conditions, this securing and nourishing of a national consciousness can only be achieved with a nation-state that corresponds to that national consciousness , Given that an individual's morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity must be preserved and encouraged.
For the opposite line, denying the importance of fixed and homogenous identity and proposing hybrid identities, see the papers in Iyall Smith and Leavy Philosophical nationalists claim that the nation is the right format for preserving and encouraging such identity-providing communities. Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures. The classical nationalist proposes that cultures should be given their own states, while the liberal nationalist proposes that cultures should get at least some form of political protection.
A particularly important variety of value is moral value.
Some values are universal, e. The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals.
I note in fairness that Taylor himself is ambivalent about the national format of morality. An often-noticed problem with this line of thought is that particular nations do not each have a special morality of their own.
Each national culture contributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable. The argument from diversity is therefore pluralistic: it ascribes value to each particular culture from the viewpoint of the collective totality of cultures. Assuming that the ethno- nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of ethno- national culture.
A pragmatic inconsistency might threaten this argument. The issue is who can legitimately propose ethno-national diversity as ideal: the nationalist is much too tied to his or her own culture to do it, while the cosmopolitan is too eager to preserve intercultural links that go beyond the idea of having a single nation-state.
Moreover, is diversity a value such that it deserves to be protected whenever it exists? Should the protection of diversity be restricted to certain aspects of culture s proposed in full generality? The line of thought 1 is not individualistic.
And 5 can be presented without reference to individuals: diversity may be good in its own right, or may be good for nations.
But the other lines of thought in the set just presented are all linked to the importance of community life in relation to the individual. In each argument, there is a general communitarian premise a community, to which one has no choice whether or not to belong, is crucial for one's identity, or for flourishing or some other important good. This premise is coupled with the more narrow, nation-centered descriptive claim that the ethno-nation is precisely the kind of community ideally suited for the task.
However, liberal nationalists do not find these arguments completely persuasive. In their view, the premises of the arguments may not support the full package of nationalist ambitions and may not be unconditionally valid.
For an even more skeptical view stemming from social science, see Hale Still, there is a lot to these arguments, and they might support liberal nationalism and a more modest stance in favor of national cultures.
We conclude this sub-section by pointing to an interesting and sophisticated pro-national stance that developed by David Miller over the course of decades, from his work of to the most recent work of He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish and other ethnic identities.
Such identity is necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple constitutional patriotism, Miller claims. A skeptic could note the following. However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, even quite contrasting appearances.
One seems to have a dilemma.
Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity. Thick constitutional patriotism may be the only possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity.
They appeal to actual or alleged circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable or permissible or even mandatory , such as a the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation states so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern , or b the circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice that might justify nationalist policies to take a special case.
Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality. A group of people of a sufficient size has a prima facie right to govern itself and decide its future membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions and practices.
This argument presents the justification of ethno- national claims as deriving from the will of the members of the nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism but not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of the nation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals.
For extended discussion of this argument, see Buchanan , which has become a contemporary classic; Moore ; and Gans For some exchanges of arguments, see J. An interesting volume from a legal perspective is Kohen , and some interesting case studies are presented in Casertano For an extremely negative judgment see Yack , Ch.
Oppression and injustice give the victimized group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is oppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minority member is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtue of belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of the minority are morally plausible and potentially compelling.
This argument implies a restrictive answer to our questions 2b and 2c : the use of force in order to achieve sovereignty is legitimate only in the cases of self-defense and redress. Of course, there is a whole lot of work to be done specifying against whom force may legitimately be used, and how much damage may be done to how many.
It establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from a liberal standpoint. See the discussion in Kukathas and Poole , also Buchanan For past injustices see Waldron Members of a minority group are often disadvantaged in relation to a dominant culture because they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to conduct the affairs of daily life. Since freedom to conduct one's daily life is a primary good, and it is difficult to change or give up reliance upon one's minority culture to attain that good, this reliance can lead to certain inequalities if special measures are not taken.
Spontaneous nation-building by the majority has to be moderated. Therefore, liberal neutrality itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural goods, i. See Kymlicka b, and Institutional protections and the right to the minority group's own institutional structure are remedies that restore equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate multicultural one.
See Kymlicka , We note an interesting recent proposal by Robert E. Goodin , who distinguishes two motivations for multiculturalism and two possible resultant kinds: polyglot multiculturalism and protective multiculturalism. The nation-state has in the past succeeded in promoting equality and democracy. Liberalism informs the notion of individual agency, but provides weak download at best on membership and on the collective cohesion and capacity of the demos.
Ethno-national solidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution of goods Miller , Canovan , The nation-state also seems to be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in the future, since it is the only form of political institution capable of protecting communities from the threats of globalization and assimilationism.
For a detailed critical discussion of this argument see Mason Calhoun himself is acutely aware of the limitations of his praise of nationalism, mentioning some on the same page as that from which we quoted above. Roshwald in his book, which cited the paradoxical and contradictory nature of nationalist claims. To quote a fine summary given by A. Smith: For Roshwald, nationalism is at once ancient and very modern; it employs twin conceptions of time, cyclical and linear; it seeks self-determination while manifesting a sense of victimhood; it insists on the nation's particularity of chosenness while claiming a universal mission; and finally, it reveals a symbiosis of kindred and mingled blood, of ethnic and civic nationhood.
Through these antinomies, nationalism is constantly able to renew itself and adapt to different situations …. Greenfeld herself is very critical of nationalism, but someone might contemplate incorporating her theory cleansed of her critical attitude into a defense of nationalism. These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian ones.
The idea of moderate nation-building points to an open multi-culturalism, in which every group receives its share of remedial rights but, instead of walling itself off from others, participates in a common, overlapping civic culture and in open communication with other sub-communities. Given the variety of pluralistic societies and intensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to many to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life see the debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka The only solution seems to be extreme moderation.
The dialectics of moderating nationalist claims in the context of pluralistic societies might thus lead to a stance respectful of cultural differences, but liberal and potentially cosmopolitan in its ultimate goals.
The liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, and there is much to be said in favor of it. It tries to reconcile our intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural communities with a liberal political morality.
Of course, this raises issues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and the particular attachments to one's ethno-cultural nation. Very liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest Tamir , ; see also Moore and Gans There is an ongoing debate among philosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromising is still compatible with a stance's being nationalist at all.
For example, Canovan ch. For a more sociological approach to the dialectic of the global and the ethno-national, see the Introduction to Delanty and Kumar and Delanty's contribution to that volume. In recent years issues of nationalism have been increasingly integrated into the debate about the international order see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism.
The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural, stable and suitable units of the international order.
A related debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of globalization see Kaldor, Moreover, the two approaches might ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common. One investigation in this direction has been undertaken by Kok-Chor Tan , see in particular ch.
However, he is quite skeptical about the convergence in his later paper see also his book. She nevertheless stresses that more than one ethnic group can have formative ties to a given territory, and that there might be competing claims based on settlement. Yack , ff starts from the same point to derive much more pessimistic conclusions. But, given the ethno-national conflicts of the twentieth century, one can safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together merely by arrangements of modus vivendi are inherently unstable.
Stability might therefore require that the pluralist society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense intra-state interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, reduce prejudice, and create a solid basis for cohabitation. On the opposite end of the spectrum, more cosmopolitan authors Buchanan , Waldron , Other Internet Resources also point to the fact of multiple settlements in roughly the same territory and to the importance of the proximity of various ethno-cultural groups.
They stress internal cultural pluralism: for reasons of peace and security, state borders should bring together distinct cultural groups typically ethno-national ones , and they in fact most often do so.
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Combining the cultural motivation to foster open multiculturalism and Waldron's security-based motivation to structure states for the purpose of resolving conflicts and establishing justice, forming a state becomes a duty we owe to anyone with whom we are likely to come into endemic conflict. Waldron , Other Internet Resources. But where should one stop?
The question arises since there are a lot of geographically open, interacting territories of various sizes. The cosmopolitan logic regarding the interests of peace and security therefore suggests joining together bigger and bigger units in a kind of recursive scheme. For instance, the EU was created to secure lasting peace, and other supra-statal and macro-regional might follow its lead.
Ultimately, the combination of ethno-cultural and security-focused considerations might thus point in a clearly cosmopolitan direction when formulating and resolving dilemmas about matters of territory. This brings us to the wider issue concerning cosmopolitanism. What are the obligations of nations and nation-states towards neighbors, and even more distant Others? This issue is regaining prominence in recent debates on nationalism. Again, see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism.
Since the present entry is on nationalism, we stress the pro-national accounts, taking Miller , as our paradigm. In principle one might think of intermediate positions falling between two extremes: on one extreme, completely closed nation-states, like in Fichte's early nineteenth century utopia of Closed commercial state; on the other, completely opened borders, like in the arrangement proposed by Joseph Carens However, the tough nationalistic line is no longer proposed seriously in ethical debates, so the furthest pro-national extreme is in fact a relatively moderate stance, exemplified by Miller in the works listed.
Here is a typical proposal of his concerning global justice based on nation states: It might become a matter of national pride to have set aside a certain percentage of GDP for developmental goals — perhaps for projects in one particular country or group of countries ….
It is a challenging idea, and a critic might ask how it would fare under normal circumstances. Imagine the proposal is accepted by leading industrial countries, and each chooses its beneficiaries.
Suppose a benefactor state B1 adopts a beneficiary state C1 and proceeds to deliver aid. What if a political faction in C1 that is hostile to B1 pushes its co-nationals to turn to some other benefactor? Similarly, if B1 needed international support in its dealings with some other powerful country B2, it would certainly count on C1 to give it.
This arrangement is beginning to look somewhat colonial. Even worse things might happen in a situation of economic crisis: if B1 has been feeding C1 for ten years, during a crisis it might become greedy for C1's resources; what would prevent it from blackmailing C1?
So much for issues of aid.
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On the opposite extreme one finds strong cosmopolitans, like Thomas Pogge, who blame the global order for injustices committed against the poor and recommend a considerable redistribution of goods as a remedy to restore justice. In between we find authors like Mathias Risse , who proposes a highly structured conception of justice that preserves the statist order of international politics but accepts common ownership of the Earth and places considerable duties on states: inequalities are allowed, but only if all inhabitants of the Earth have enough to satisfy their basic needs.
Miller has also put forward the most thoughtful pro-nationalist proposal concerning immigration. His proposal allows refugees to seek asylum temporarily until the situation in their country of origin improves; it also limits economic migration.
Urine volume, urine sediment and myoglobin levels would be ascertained. Tipo IV Oneupweb T The classic ischemic forearm protocol was compared with the identical protocol without ischemia. Tsujino et al . Branched-chain amino acids BCA. Yet another molecular genetic testing strategy is use of a multi- gene panel that includes PYGM and other genes of interest see Differential Diagnosis. Two novel mutations in the myophosphorylase gene in a patient with McArdle disease.
The liver can also show fibrosis and sometimes cirrhosis. Nat Clin Pract Neurol.
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Included in the variety of methods that may be used are: An adenoviral recombinant containing the full-length human myophosphorylase cDNA was efficiently transduced into phosphorylase-deficient sheep and human myoblasts, where it restored enzyme activity [ Pari et al ].
Muscle biopsy of 5 patients showed glycogen accumulation. Also, serum electrolytes and endocrine studies such as thyroid function, parathyroid function and growth hormone levels will also be completed. Support Center Support Center. The ischemic exercise consists of the patient squeezing a hand dynamometer at maximal strength for a specific period of time, usually a minute, with a blood gludogenosis cuff, which is placed on the upper arm and set at mmHg, blocking blood flow to the exercising arm.
These symptoms are usually precipitated by isometric exercise e. CGlucogeenosis ]. All had typical features of the disorder, including exercise intolerance, decreased or absent PYGM activity and immunostaining in muscle samples, and increased serum creatine kinase.The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism; its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned, including for the individual members of the ethno-nation.
Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a. The moral debate about nationalism has resulted in various weakenings of culture-based arguments, proposed by liberal nationalists, which render the arguments less ambitious but much more plausible.
On the opposite end, which is mild, humane and liberal, the central nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only see Tamir , Gans , and most recently Miller's book, which looks for a compromise. Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry The first level of political organization might thus be non-liberal Kukathas hopes it will not turn out to be so , while the second level would be strongly liberal.
The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims see Miller and Meissels , with some refinements discussed below. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and the individual's own life in particular.
Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest Tamir , ; see also Moore and Gans